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The Effect of Priority Date on Price of Temporary Water Rights Transfers
Abstract
This research extends the analysis of De Mouche et al. (2011) and Colby et al. (1993) relating price
differentials in per acre-foot terms to the priority date of water rights and hydrologic conditions using
experimental economic data. This study investigates the effect that priority date, or the year the right was
established, can have on the price of leases in the market for water rights and will expand on the existing
literature by using an experimental data set to test the relationship. It is hypothesized that senior water rights,
those with an older priority date, will have higher prices, while junior water rights, those that have been more
recently established, will have lower prices. A cross-sectional analysis using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
model will be conducted to test this hypothesis. If the expected relationship is observed and found to be
significant, this study may have policy implications that could impact decisions to regulate the market for
temporary water rights transfers more strictly in the Western United States. Ultimately, since water scarcity
and water rights are a growing economic and environmental concern in regions around the globe, extensions
of this work may lead to new policies and regulations on a global level.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol22/iss1/14
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXII58
I.  Introduction and Background
 In the Western Region of the United 
States, where water is a scarce resource, various 
water-trading schemes, both temporary and 
permanent, have been attempted over the years. 
Under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriations 
(DPA), the property rights regime that was 
established in the late 1860s and dominates 
the Western half of the U.S., the first user to 
claim a source of water and put that water to 
beneficial use has the indefinite right to use the 
source exclusively. These rights can be inherited 
from one generation to another, or transferred 
between parties in a marketplace. 
 Today, more than 100 years after the DPA 
was established, the population of the western 
region continues to boom at a rate of 2% per 
year in urban areas, and agricultural production 
in this region is becoming increasingly crucial 
to the national economy (DeMouche et al., 
2011). Denser urban populations and intensive 
agricultural production both require water, 
a limited resource. Increased stress on water 
resources in the region have resulted in a need 
for trade, but permanent transfers are not 
incentivized as there is more value to the original 
user in holding the right in perpetuity. Because of 
the infeasibility of permanent transfers, markets 
for temporary transfers, or leases, of water rights 
have been employed in an attempt to meet the 
needs of water consumers, primarily agricultural 
users. These transfers occur when the permanent 
rights holder leases the right to their priority 
of use to another user temporarily. A lease 
is beneficial for both parties as it fulfills the 
immediate need for water and allows the original 
rights holder to profit while still maintaining the 
right to use the water in the future (Shupe et al., 
1989).
 
 The term of any individual lease is 
negotiable and can range from one month to 
several years. Despite growing use of these 
markets, they remain inefficient because 
little is known about the willingness to pay 
of demanders, the willingness to accept 
of consumers, priority, and the impact of 
environmental and hydrologic conditions on 
these factors. The lack of information and 
scramble to acquire water rights has resulted 
in an array of trade prices over time and across 
markets. 
 De Mouche et al. (2012) investigated 
what factors affect the price of temporary water 
rights using data from transfers occurring from 
1987 to 2005. When urban municipalities were 
the consumers the average price of the transfer 
is $4400.00 per acre/foot, compared to only 
$1700.00 per acre/foot when the resource is 
going to crops (De Mouche et al., 2012). This 
price discrepancy represents inefficiency in the 
market for temporary water rights, a problem 
that has occurred because the owners of the 
permanent rights do not know the value of the 
temporary rights to demanders, and vice versa. 
A number of other factors, both environmental 
and economic, affect the price of a temporary 
water rights transfer in the west. The identity 
of the demander plays an important role, as 
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does the presence of drought, and the ability of 
agricultural demanders to stack multiple leases 
and use more than the legal limit of water in 
an effort to reap higher yields or produce more 
water intensive crops (De Mouche et al., 2011). 
 The seminal theoretical work on the 
subject by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) connects 
the three major property rights regimes in the 
United States, riparian doctrine, appropriative 
doctrine, and a third system blending the 
features of these two systems, with the economic 
concepts of security, transferability, and welfare. 
The theoretical analysis in the literature has 
been extended to include measures of welfare, 
potential third party effects, and suggested 
implementation of markets for temporary 
transfers of water rights to increase efficiency 
(Gould, 1989). Using the principle of use-value, 
and assuming that the buyer of a right has a 
higher use-value for the right than the seller, 
Libecap (2005) offers a more recent refinement 
to the theoretical basis for markets for temporary 
transfers of water rights under the Doctrine 
of Prior Appropriations (DPA) established by 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) and Gould (1989). He 
suggests that a senior right should have a higher 
value because it comes with a greater guarantee 
of receiving an allotment of water (Libecap, 
2005). It has greater security because the right’s 
holder is guaranteed to receive the water they are 
entitled to before any junior user via diversion 
of the source or a bulk water transfer (Gould, 
1989). As Ciriacy-Wantrup (1956) describes, 
“under natural conditions a senior appropriative 
right is more secure than a junior appropriative 
right against physical uncertainty.” The holder 
of a junior right may have a higher use-value for 
water because of the potential value of their crop 
yield, and thus, a higher willingness to pay for 
the senior right and security that comes with it. 
Because reliability of the right is directly linked 
to the right’s priority date, if a right is more 
senior, it should receive a higher price in the 
market (Libecap, 2005). 
 Modern water transfers occur using a 
number of market mechanisms including water 
banks, bulletin board markets, double-auction 
markets, derivative markets, environmental 
leasing and purchase programs, and 
combinations of these systems (Hadjigeorgalis, 
2009). However, large transaction costs and 
incomplete information result in large price 
differentials of temporary water rights transfers 
(Colby, et al., 1993; Broadbent et al., 2009; De 
Mouche et al., 2011). These same factors impede 
the markets in general and have resulted in few 
traded rights (De Mouche et al., 2011). While 
scholars have used real data and found that 
price differentials observed in the markets exist 
because of priority dates (De Mouche et al., 2011; 
Colby et al., 1993), transaction size, and various 
additional buyer, seller, and environmental 
characteristics, data limitations remain a chief 
concern (De Mouche et al., 2011; Bjornlund and 
Rossini, 2005). 
 Because real transaction data is in short 
supply, water resources, and environmental 
economists have relied on experimental 
economics methods to test their hypotheses 
regarding the temporary transfer of water rights. 
Over the past two decades hypothetical markets 
have been coupled with hydrologic models in an 
attempt to determine whether parties engaged 
in each transaction, the direction of the trade, 
the size of the transaction measured in acre-feet, 
and the impact on the physical system affect the 
price of the transfer (Broadbent et al., 2009). In 
accordance with the theoretical developments of 
Gould (1989) and Libecap (2005), Broadbent et 
al. (2009) finds that regardless of the identity of 
the buyer, more trades of larger overall quantity 
occurred when the meteorological conditions 
of the region were drier and the supply of water 
was more uncertain. An empirical study in 
Australia, another hotbed of water resource 
allocation issues, yielded similar results, showing 
agricultural users utilized the market more 
heavily when low precipitation was expected, 
and that higher overall prices were observed 
for farmers with higher use-values (i.e., dairy 
farmers) (Brooks and Harris, 2008). 
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 This research extends the analysis of De 
Mouche et al. (2011) and Colby et al. (1993) 
relating price differentials in per acre-foot terms 
to the priority date of water rights and hydrologic 
conditions using experimental economic data. 
This study investigates the effect that priority 
date, or the year the right was established, can 
have on the price of leases in the market for 
water rights and will expand on the existing 
literature by using an experimental data set to 
test the relationship. It is hypothesized that senior 
water rights, those with an older priority date, 
will have higher prices, while junior water rights, 
those that have been more recently established, 
will have lower prices. A cross-sectional analysis 
using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model 
will be conducted to test this hypothesis. If the 
expected relationship is observed and found 
to be significant, this study may have policy 
implications that could impact decisions 
to regulate the market for temporary water 
rights transfers more strictly in the Western 
United States. Ultimately, since water scarcity 
and water rights are a growing economic and 
environmental concern in regions around the 
globe, extensions of this work may lead to new 
policies and regulations on a global level. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section two describes the experimental data 
and methodology used to test the relationship 
between price per-acre foot, priority date, and 
four additional explanatory variables. Section 
three discusses the results of the regression 
analysis and the fourth section discusses the 
implications of the relationship between priority 
date and price in markets for temporary water 
transfers in systems operating under the DPA. 
II.  Data and Methods
 An experiment conducted at Illinois 
Wesleyan University (IWU) in 2012 provided 
the data set used to test the hypothesis that 
priority dates are positively related to the price of 
temporary water transfers. Dr. Craig Broadbent 
conducted the experiment over a four-week 
period in the fall of 2012. Thirteen Senior 
Economics students were paid a $50.00 show up 
fee, which they could add to through engaging in 
market transactions. Eleven students represented 
rights holders and engaged in the market and 
two students served as alternates. One student 
represented a senior water rights holder, meaning 
their right to the source was established in 1869. 
Eight students represented junior rights holders, 
meaning their rights were established in 1870, 
1880, 1893, or 1894. One student represented a 
residential user, and the last student represented 
a supplemental well, or a surplus reserve of water 
for residential users. 
 During the first week of the experiment, 
the students were given background information 
about the DPA. They were introduced to the 
software used to conduct the trades, which 
was developed by Dr. Broadbent’s research 
team at the Sandia National Laboratories and 
the University of Texas. The students also 
participated in a similar type of experimental 
economics activity during week two, in order to 
gain a better understanding of the purpose of the 
study and to grasp the procedure of what they 
would be doing in the following weeks. 
 During weeks three and four the actual 
experiments were conducted. Experiments one 
and two were conducted in week three and 
simulated a situation in which there was a call 
on the water source. A call occurs in times of 
drought, usually during the summer months, 
and is when a senior user indicates that they have 
not received their allotment of water and places 
a “call” which stops junior users from diverting 
water. In experiment one, a call on the source 
of water occurred during the months of June 
and July, impacting 7 of the 44 accepted trades. 
In experiment two, a call occurred during June 
only, and affected 6 of the 45 accepted trades. 
Experiments three and four were conducted in 
the final week and simulated a situation in which 
stacking was allowed. Stacking is the ability of 
agricultural users to irrigate their land with more 
than the legally allotted volume of water per acre, 
currently 2.7 acre-feet of water per acre over the 
growing season. When stacking was allowed, 
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every trade in the experiment received a 1 for 
stacking. In experiment three, a call occurred, in 
addition to stacking, during the months of July 
and August with 12 of the 51 accepted trades in 
this experiment affected. These two conditions 
were included in the experimental model in 
order to gauge the effect of hydrologic conditions 
on the price of temporary water transfers.  
 The data from these four experiments 
is cross-sectional and yielded 201 accepted 
temporary transfers with a fixed term of one 
month. Experiment one produced 44 trades, 
experiment two yielded 45 accepted trades, 
experiment three produced 51 accepted trades, 
and experiment four yielded 61 trades for a total 
of 201 trades. For each individual trade, the 
seller’s name, the buyer’s name, the total price 
paid in U.S. Dollars, and the quantity, measured 
as the number of acre-feet traded was recorded. 
The price per acre-foot was calculated from the 
recorded information for each accepted transfer 
by dividing the total price paid from the buyer 
to the seller in U.S. Dollars by the total number 
of acre-feet traded. Five dummy variables were 
created and recorded to indicate the month of a 
call, if stacking was allowed, and the type of trade 
that occurred (i.e. senior to junior user, junior 
to junior user, or agricultural user to residential 
user). Trades were given a value of one if the 
factors measured by the dummy variables were 
present or applicable to the trade, so, if a call 
occurred, a trade was given a value of one for the 
call variable. There are three potential categories 
for the type of trade: senior agricultural user to 
junior agricultural user trades, junior agricultural 
user to junior agricultural user trades, and 
agricultural user, which can be senior or junior 
users, to residential user trades. For any given 
trade, only one of these categories is applicable, 
so the trades received a one for the dummy 
variable measuring the category in which they 
best fit and a zero for all other dummy variables 
excluding junior to junior trades. 
 The average price per acre-foot across all 
201 accepted trades is $3.71. The maximum price 
per acre-foot in an accepted trade was $7.00, and 
the minimum was $2.00. For each priority date, 
there is a wide dispersion of prices per acre-foot. 
Most trades were accepted at a price per acre-
foot of $2.00 to $5.00, with a few outliers that 
occurred at $6.00 or $7.00 per acre-foot.  The 
general trend is that in trades from senior users 
and higher priority date junior users, the prices 
per acre-foot are higher, as pictured in Figure 1 in 
Appendix A. The average price of trades of 1869 
priority date rights is $4.02; for trades of rights 
with an 1870 priority date the average price is 
$4.38. The prices for the three more junior dates, 
1880, 1893, and 1894 averaged at $3.76, $3.55, 
and $3.28, respectively. 
 An Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
(OLS) in Eviews software was used to test this 
hypothesis and determine the relationship 
between price per acre-foot (price per quantity) 
and the priority date of the water right. Equation 
1 shows the model with price per acre-foot as the 
dependent variable, and priority date, occurrence 
of a call, presence of stacking, senior to junior 
user trade, and agricultural to residential user 
trade as the independent variables. Trades 
occurring between any agricultural user, 
regardless of seniority, to either the residential 
user or the supplemental well were given a value 
of one for agricultural to residential trades. The 
expected relationship between these variables, 
summarized in Table 1 in Appendix A, is positive 
for priority date, meaning that the older the 
water right, the higher the price paid, positive for 
a call, negative for stacking, positive for Senior 
to Junior trades, and negative for Agricultural to 
Residential user trades.   
Equation 1:  
Price Per Acre-Foot = α +β1(Priority Date)+ 
β2(Call) + β3(Stacking) +β4(Senior to Junior) +
β5(Agricultural User to Residential User) + e
III.  Results
 The empirical model tests the relationship 
between prices per acre-foot of temporarily 
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transferred water rights and the priority date 
of the right being traded (Equation 1). Four 
additional variables are included in the model. 
Occurrence of a call, stacking, and two dummy 
variables which capture the nature of the trading 
parties and gauge the effect of the identities 
of the traders on price per acre-foot. The first 
is senior user to junior user and the second is 
agricultural user to residential user transactions. 
For both variables, a value of one indicates that 
the trade falls into the category of the trade 
that is measured by the variable. Thus, the final 
expression is given in equation 1. Using the 
cumulative data from all four of the individual 
experiments, or trading rounds, an Ordinary 
Least Squares regression produced the expected 
results, summarized in Table 2 in Appendix A.
  The estimated coefficient for priority 
date was negative, which is consistent with 
the predicted outcome as a lower numbered 
year (i.e., 1860) is more senior than a higher 
numbered year (i.e., 1893) (De Mouche et al, 
2011). The relationship observed is a direct 
relationship indicating that earlier years or 
older rights demand higher prices per acre-foot. 
Additionally, a dummy variable was included 
to denote trades occurring between the senior 
user, whose right was established in 1869, and 
any of the various junior users. The sign for the 
coefficient indicating a senior to junior transfers 
was positive, indicating that a senior to junior 
trade earned a higher price per acre-foot than a 
trade between two junior users. 
 The magnitude of the coefficients for each 
of these variables was small, 0.0199 and 0.4641, 
respectively. For a one-year decrease in seniority, 
the price per acre-foot falls by about $0.02. 
The most senior right was established in 1869, 
and the most junior, in 1894, so, the predicted 
difference in price between the most senior 
and most junior rights is approximately $0.50. 
Similarly, the difference in price between a senior 
to junior transfer and a transfer between junior 
uses is $0.46. It is crucial to consider that in this 
set of experimental data, the average price per 
acre-foot was $3.73. The impact of seniority on 
price is 12.3% of the average price.
 As expected, the presence of a call, 
captured through a dummy variable, was 
positively related to the price per quantity. 
The coefficient for this variable, 0.3202, was 
significant at the 1% level. This result is not 
surprising because when there is a shortage of a 
scarce resource such as water, the price of that 
resource, in this case the per acre-foot, rises. 
Stacking, an indicator of a surplus of water at a 
particular water source had the opposite impact 
on the price of one-month temporary transfers. 
Stacking was also indicated by a dummy variable 
in the same fashion as the call variable. This 
coefficient, -0.2230, indicated that the presence 
of stacking resulted in a decrease in the price 
per acre-foot of water of $0.22. In essence, this 
indicates that there is not as great of a need to 
trade water rights in times of surplus because it is 
likely that all users, even those most junior, will 
gain access to the water that they need regardless 
of priority. If rights holders are trading to new 
users who have never before held their own 
water rights, the price demanded will remain 
low because there is more competition to lease 
that right and rights holders with no use for 
the water may undercut other rights holders in 
order to transfer their right and avoid losing it 
under the DPA’s beneficial use clause. Transfers 
between agricultural users and residential users 
in which the residential user purchases the right 
resulted in a negative coefficient of -0.3939, 
indicating that when water is transferred from an 
agricultural user to a residential user it sells for 
less than agricultural to agricultural trades.  
 The adjusted R squared for this regression 
was .3536, indicating that approximately 35.4% 
of the variation in price per acre-foot across 
transactions was explained by these five factors. 
The F-statistic for the regression is 22.8842 and 
is significant at the 1% level indicating that as 
a group these explanatory variables are able to 
explain the variance in price per acre-foot.  
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IV.  Conclusions
 This paper examines the relationship 
between the price of temporary water rights 
transfers and the priority date of the right in 
order to extend the body of literature that seeks 
to influence the design and regulation of water 
leasing markets and to provide fuller information 
to buyers and sellers. Using an Ordinary 
Least Squares regression, this study tests the 
relationship between the price, in dollars, per 
acre-foot of water traded in an experimental 
market and the priority date of the right.  Four 
additional explanatory variables were used: the 
presence of a call, stacking, and the parties that 
the transfer occurs between, senior to junior 
transfers, and agricultural user to residential user 
transfers.  
 The results of the regression were 
consistent with the predicted outcomes. Each 
of the coefficients for the five independent 
variables was significant at a high level and had 
the predicted sign. Priority date was observed 
to be correlated with price in an inverse fashion, 
which, considering that the actual year was used 
in each observation for the variable, means that 
the older or more senior a right, the higher the 
price it will sell for. This is consistent with the 
literature on the topic that suggests the more 
secure, less risky senior rights will sell at higher 
prices because the purchasing party is willing 
to pay more for a lower risk of not receiving the 
water they purchased, even in times of drought.  
 The results of this regression, which 
show with a high degree of certainty that senior 
water rights held under the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriations will command higher prices 
than their junior counterparts when traded 
temporarily for a period of one month, could 
be used to inform buyers and sellers in similar 
markets in the western United States. With 
more complete information about the effects 
of seniority and environmental conditions on 
the demand and willingness to pay for water 
rights, sellers and buyers should be able to 
come to an agreement on price more quickly. 
In turn, this increased efficiency could increase 
the number of trades that occur making these 
markets a reasonable solution for the problem of 
water allocation in the West. The results of this 
research may also be used by regulatory agencies 
to set prices or restrictions in the markets in an 
effort to increase efficiency and improve water 
allocation.
 The results of this study can be used as 
the groundwork for more extensive research 
into the impact of priority on price in the face of 
other external conditions. With more extensive 
experimental data, additional scenarios could 
be tested to better understand the market for 
temporary water transfers. In this experiment, 
the term of the lease was fixed at one month and 
was non-negotiable. Giving the players in the 
experiment the freedom to decide to buy or sell 
the rights for longer periods of time would allow 
future researchers to test whether or not seniority 
has an effect on the length of the lease negotiated, 
and if the length of the lease has an impact on the 
price per acre-foot per month. A second option 
for further research would be to jointly test the 
impact of variables such as seniority and a call 
or seniority and stacking using a multivariate 
analysis. More extensive data is required to run 
such a test as this experiment contained only a 
handful of observations that would have met the 
necessary criteria. Finally, further extensions of 
this research could include testing the impact 
of priority date on the price of permanent 
transfers of the right. Admittedly, a number of 
practical problems would present themselves 
in a permanent transfer situation because there 
is no incentive to sell a right that you could 
otherwise lease month after month or year after 
year to produce a steady stream of income if you 
hold the most senior right. However, such an 
experiment may provide insight into the transfer 
of rights between junior users or between current 
rights holders and parties that do not currently 
own the rights to a water source. 
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                                                                                 Appendix
Liubicich
Variable Expected Sign
Priority -
Call (1 = call; 0 = no call) +
Agricultural to Residential User (1 = agricul-
tural to residential user; 0 = no)
-
Stacking (1 = stacking; 0 = no stacking) -
Senior to Junior (1 = Senior to Junior user; 
0 = no)
+
Table 1: Expected signs
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Variable Coefficient
Priority -0.0199***
(4.6014)
Call (1 = call; 0 = no call) 0.3202***
(2.7479)
Agricultural to Residential User (1 = agri-
cultural to residential user; 0 = no)
-0.3909***
(4.3044)
Stacking (1 = stacking; 0 = no stacking) -0.2230**
(2.5447)
Senior to Junior (1 = Senior to Junior user; 
0 = no)
0.4641***
(2.6837)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3536
F-Statistic 22.884**
Table 2: Estimation Results of the relationship between 
price per acre-foot and priority date
Values in parentheses are absolute 
statistics
***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level
